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The Syntax of Legal Exceptions 
How the Absence of Proof Is a Proof of Absence Thereof 
 




In this review article of Duarte d’Almeida (Allowing for Exceptions: A Theory 
of Defences and Defeasibility in Law. Oxford: University Press, 2015), I am 
going to survey and criticise the concept, philosophical background and legal 
applications of defeasibility and legal exceptions in law. Through critical 
engagement with Duarte d’Almeida’s methodological assumptions and 
theoretical presuppositions, I shall identify a series of pressure points in the 
book’s central claims and theses about the theoretical status of legal exceptions 
(defeaters). First, I will facilitate a proper understanding of HLA Hart’s 
conceptual apparatus by pointing out its roots in the Oxford Ordinary Language 
Philosophy. Second, I will read Duarte d’Almeida’s monograph against this 
background and facilitate a better understanding of the syntax of defeaters, 
Hart’s original topic. Third, I will show that defeaters in criminal adjudication 
are part and parcel of a justificatory structure, whose main feature is the 
defeasibility of the respective exceptions. 
 





A. On Essentialism 
What is an F? A conception of a definition as an investigation into essences, ie 
as an inquiry into finding what is quintessentially F-ish, is ubiquitous. 
Essentialism, from the quotidian “What is a chair?” to the momentous “What is 
justice?”, has preoccupied us since the dawn of western philosophy. Plato, to 
begin with, conceived a definition of F as an investigation into the essential 
nature of F-ness.1 The same methodology was an integral part of Aristotle’s way 
of thinking. He believed that the proper definition of the object or notion 
denoted by a word is to be achieved by the specification of its ‘genus’ and 
‘differentia’, ie its necessary and sufficient conditions.2 
 
1 Plato, Cratylus, § 388c. 
2 Aristotle, Metaphysics, Book 7, part 12; See Benedict de Spinoza, ‘On the Improvement of the Understanding’, 
The Chief works of Benedict de Spinoza vol. 2 trans. RHM Elwes (Dover Publications, 1955) § 95. Spinoza 
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Questions like the ones mentioned above by no means sound strange to the 
legal community. On the contrary, legal thinking can be conceived as an 
exercise in essentialism, namely the doctrine that some of the attributes of a 
thing are necessary.3 The traditional way to frame a legal question, “What is x?”, 
can be rewritten as the formula: an object x has a property y, essentially, if and 
only if z conditions apply.4 For example, if we hold someone criminally liable 
for having F-ed, we’d want to understand what F-ing means (the characteristic 
marks composing the concept of F as a unique entity). By managing to define a 
legal concept, it will–so the mainstream approach–in turn qua pre-existing rule 
apply smoothly (deductively) to the things that fall under it, in virtue of these 
things’ possessing essential properties (genus proximum et differentia specifica). 
Or so one might argue. HLA Hart was–among others–not sympathetic to these 
ideas. Both essentialism and the image of judicial activity conceived as a 
calculus were taken to be deeply flawed. We can even argue that anti-
essentialism was the main thrust of Hart’s way of thinking.5 He was at pains to 
stress that ‘subsumption and the drawing of a syllogistic conclusion no longer 
characterise the nerve of the reasoning involved in determining what is the right 
thing to do’.6 Therefore, it shouldn’t come as a surprise that Hart’s masterpiece 
begins with a similarly ‘persistent’ question: ‘What is law?’.7 So ingrained in his 
philosophical thinking was this view that it keeps coming back throughout his 
oeuvre. Thus, Hart wants to make clear that seemingly ‘innocent requests for 
definition’–Hart regards this type of question as a ‘blinding error’8–like ‘What is 
a contract?’ or “What is a legal exception?” cannot be meaningfully raised.9 It is 
in Hart’s opinion ‘absurd’ to use the language of necessary and sufficient 
conditions in connection with them.10 To say that does not mean to replace one 
 
wrote, among others, that ‘a definition, if it is to be perfect, must explain the inmost essence of a thing’. Last but 
not least G Frege, who is considered as the founder of modern mathematical logic and so-called grandfather of 
analytic philosophy was equally troubled about the difficulty we have in answering the question “What is a 
number”? (see M Dummett, Gottlob Frege, in: AP Martinich/D. Sosa (ed.), A Companion to Analytic Philosophy 
(Blackwell: Malden, 2001) 6). It is a scandal, Frege contends, that the science of mathematics ‘should be so 
unclear about the first and foremost of its objects’ (G Frege, The Foundations of Arithmetic trans. JL Austin 
(Blackwell Publishing, 1953) 2. 
3 For a short discussion on the intelligibility of essentialism, see RL Cartwright, ‘Some Remarks on 
Essentialism’ (1968) 65 Journal of Philosophy 615. 
4 Ibid, 623. 
5 Cf. F Schauer, ‘Hart’s Anti-Essentialism’ in L Duarte d’Almeida and A Dolcetti (eds), Reading HLA Hart’s: 
The Concept of Law (Hart Publishing, 2013), 424–443. 
6 HLA Hart, The Concept of Law, 2nd ed. (Clarendon Press, 1994) 127. 
7 Ibid, 1 et passim; cf. his inaugural lecture, HLA Hart, ‘Definition and Theory in Jurisprudence’, Essays in 
Jurisprudence and Philosophy (Oxford University Press, 1983) 22. 
8 HLA Hart and T Honoré, Causation in the law (Clarendon Press, 2002) 3: “legal language and reasoning will 
never be understood while it [the search for ‘one true meaning’] persists”. 
9 Hart, ‘Definition and Theory in Jurisprudence’ (n 7) 39. 
10 HLA Hart, ‘The Ascription of Responsibility and Rights’ (1949) 49 Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 
173; cf. Hart, ‘The Concept of Law’ (n 6) 116, where he, nonetheless, uses in a very inconsistent way the very 
same criterion that he rejects: ‘There are therefore two minimum conditions necessary and sufficient for the 
existence of a legal system’. 
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account of F’s essence with another, but to rather give up the whole attempt to 
inquire into such a question by eliminating these temptations at their root. For 
Hart advanced a different approach according to which rules governing our 
language games form a more comprehensive and complex syntax than the one 
that can be adequately described by formal logic or a theory of meaning. 
 
B. Hart’s Philosophical Background 
But how did Hart come to repudiate essentialism and the necessary and 
sufficient conditions as a methodological tool for yielding legal definitions? I 
suggest that this answer comes relatively easy. A few years before, Ludwig 
Wittgenstein–who had become very suspicious of the intelligibility of 
essentialism–had, wave after wave, shaped the landscape of British philosophy. 
As Russell explains:11  
‘During the period since 1914 three philosophies have successively dominated the British 
philosophical world: first that of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus, second that of the Logical 
Positivists12 and third that of Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations’.  
One could demur that this explanation is too abstract–admittedly. Let’s get more 
specific. Misleading as it may be to put labels, Oxford–the place where Hart’s 
legal thinking flourished–had by that time become the stronghold of the analytic 
philosophy of language (aka “Oxford Ordinary Language Philosophy”), namely 
a school of thought based on Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations.13 Hart 
himself names JL Austin and L Wittgenstein as the two most important figures in 
his philosophical development.14 For better or worse, this was the philosophical 
‘oxygen’15 Hart was breathing. Contemporary analytic philosophy had a ‘deep 
impact’16 on his work–among other things: Wittgenstein’s late philosophy, 
namely the abandonment of the very possibility of a theory of meaning or of 
discovering the logical form of a proposition. For those were the ‘grave 
mistakes’17 he had been forced to recognize by rejecting the idea, according to 
which non-elementary propositions could be understood in terms of truth-
 
11 B Russell, My Philosophical Development (Allen & Unwin, 1959) 216. 
12 The Vienna Circle was a group of Austrian philosophers who met once a week in order to discuss, mainly, the 
ideas expressed in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (L Wittgenstein, ‘Tractatus Logico-
Philosophicus’ trans. DF Pears and BF McGuiness (Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1958)). The basic tenet of their 
(antimetaphysical) doctrine was the proposition that if a proposition is to have meaning at all, there must be a 
method of establishing its truth and falsity. As Monk (R Monk, Ludwig Wittgenstein (Vintage Books, 1991) 286-
7) remarks ‘This became known to the Vienna Circle as “Wittgenstein’s Principle of Verification”, and […] has 
been regarded ever since as the very essence of logical positivism”. 
13 PMS Hacker, ‘Hart’s Philosophy of Law’ in PMS Hacker and J Raz (eds), Law, Morality and Society: Essays 
in Honour of H.L.A. Hart (Clarendon Press, 1977) 2; cf. S Schroeder, Wittgenstein (Polity Press, 2006) 237-8. 
14 D Sugarman and HLA Hart, ‘Hart Interviewed: H.L.A. Hart in Conversation with David Sugarman’ (2005) 
32(2) Journal of Law and Society 267; see also A Lefebvre, ‘Law and the Ordinary: Hart, Wittgenstein, 
Jurisprudence’ (2011) 154 Telos 99. 
15 Wittgenstein once said for himself: “I manufacture my own oxygen” (cited from Monk, Ludwig Wittgenstein 
(n 12) 6). 
16 Hacker (n 13) 3. 
17 L Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations trans. GEM Anscombe (Basil Blackwell, 1958) viii. 
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conditions, based on an axiomatic system of predicate logic and a finite 
vocabulary.18 
Therefore, it would be no exaggeration if holding that a) the idea that 
indeterminacy in language is ineliminable (that essentialism is unintelligible), 
and b) formal logic in conjunction with rule-scepticism ‘are the Scylla and 
Charybdis of juristic theory’,19 are integral parts of Hart’s oeuvre. 
 
C. Allowing for Exceptions 
However, the present study is not designed to offer any exegesis of Hart’s 
theory of law, let alone of his general philosophy of language, since this is just a 
review article. And this is where Luís Duarte d’Almeida steps in. In his recent 
monograph ‘Allowing for Exceptions – A Theory of Defences and Defeasibility 
in Law’ (Oxford: University Press, 2015),20 the author tries to draw on one of 
Hart’s original topics by clarifying the misunderstandings about defeasibility in 
law and by developing a proof-based account of legal exceptions. Precisely, he 
wants to clarify their theoretical status by showing that the absence of a legal 
exception is not something that has to be ascertained (eg ‘for someone to be 
properly convicted of rape’, 132). 
 Through critical engagement with Duarte d’Almeida’s methodological 
assumptions and philosophical presuppositions, I shall identify a series of 
pressure points in the book’s central claims and theses. Our introduction 
(sections 1.A and 1.B) have delivered the arguments in order to attack the 
premises of the book and to highlight some convoluted ideas and shortcomings. 
Since I will concentrate on these issues and engage in a critical exegesis, let me 
state unequivocally that this is a valuable work of legal theoretical scholarship. 
 
2. What is a Legal Exception? 
 
A. On Exceptions 
Duarte d’Almeida gets straight down to business from the first page of his 
book. He provides a detailed insight into the appearance of courts’ activities, 
which in turn explains why it is imperative to gain clarity about the use of legal 
exceptions. Courts seem to suspend general rules like ‘You ought not to kill’ 
whenever ‘faced with exceptional turns of events’ (3). Not only, I think, do we 
depart from rules by allowing exceptions– depriving the law of one of its genetic 
elements, its generality–but we do so in uncontrolled, theoretically unwarranted 
ways. 
In fact, we lack a synoptic view of legal exceptions (defences). Undoubtedly, 
we can say that duress is a defence and that, most importantly, someone who 
 
18 Schroeder, Wittgenstein (n 13) 238. 
19 Hart, ‘The Concept of Law’ (n 6) 147. See also at 139 where Hart calls them ‘unattainable ideal[s]’. 
20 Unattributed page references in the text and ensuing notes relate to this book. 
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confesses her wrongdoing will not be convicted if she brings a defence into play. 
Furthermore, every legal system is being criss-crossed with exceptions and 
while we can, seemingly, cope with situations like those described above, we go 
wrong every time we ‘go theoretical’ on these issues. As with any practical 
ability, we can give hints and rules of thumb for the practice of exceptions; but 
this practice, I think, cannot be systematised or reduced to a set of rules. All this 
raises the question of what an exception is, to begin with–a question on which 
there is no consensus at all. The picture sketched above–that ‘[w]ithin limits, the 
law allows for exceptions’ (3)–is ‘deceptively clear’ (4). There seems to be a 
contradiction between applying a general rule and taking into consideration 
exceptional circumstances. 
As a result, too many questions remain unanswered insofar as the doctrinal 
status of legal exceptions remains unsatisfactorily conceptualised. ‘Should 
courts be allowed to set aside the relevant legal rules when faced with 
exceptional turns of events?’ (3). What authorises them to do so? And are we 
talking about exceptions to the law or to some other general rule? Is there any 
pervasive difference other than the (deliberate) legislator’s choice that ‘we think 
of self-defence in murder as a defence or exception and don’t similarly think of 
consent as a defence or exception in rape?’ (6). How can we–last but not least–
correctly convict someone although we have not ruled out all his possible 
defences; even those not actively been brought into play? 
Duarte d’Almeida is utterly right in stressing that our theoretical 
understanding of exceptions cannot depend on ‘contingent matter[s]’ such as the 
lawmaker’s decision ‘whether the negation of some given fact x is classified by 
law as an offence-element, or x is classified as a defence instead’ (6). Only by 
engaging in a thickly descriptive21 analysis and by shedding light on the 
microstructure of the inferential patterns and linkages (underpinning the rule-
governed use of legal exceptions) can the role of exceptions in judicial decision 
making be understood. Otherwise the rule sceptic shows his teeth. For he can 
claim that whenever we apply exceptions, we deviate from the rule, and do so in 
ways that are not governed by rules. Legal adjudication can, thus, easily start 
rolling down the slippery slope of an open-ended set of exceptions. So 
d’Almeida’s objective is to identify essential commonalities in rules governing 
legal exceptions, thus providing their grammar and allowing the law to ‘perform 
its action-guiding function’ (3). 
Duarte D’Almeida thus sets an ambitious goal which everyone should 
embrace. In an era of rather one-dimensional doctrinal analysis in which 
(academic) lawyers automatically switch off as soon as they are confronted with 
 
21 Duarte d’Almeida stresses the fact that his ‘concern throughout this book has been descriptive, not normative’. 
His aim is, thus, not to say anything about the content of legal exceptions, ie ‘which facts ought to be classified 
as exceptions’ (266) – My emphasis. Kelsen has famously advanced the ‘structural analysis of law as a system of 
valid norms’ to the quintessence of his pure theory of law, see H Kelsen, General Theory of Law and State trans. 
Anders Wedberg (The Lawbook Exchange, 1945) 162-3. 
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theoretical legal inquiries–let alone conceptual formulas–the author chooses to 
provide us with a theoretical understanding of our practical considerations: ‘One 
goal of this book is to challenge the way lawyers commonly think about legal 
defences and the interplay of claims or accusations and answers in procedural 
contexts’ (7). For questions like the ones asked above, he argues, are ‘the 
product of several interconnected and widespread mistakes’.  The author wants 
to overcome these mistakes by deploying his ‘proof-based account–that seeks to 
reconcile the seemingly conflicting’, but not yet properly articulated, ‘intuitions 
that we have about exceptions’ (7). In order to reach his goal, Duarte d’Almeida 
revisits and scrutinises Hart’s influential and later retracted22 paper ‘The 
Ascription of Responsibility and Rights’.23 Neither Duarte d’Almeida nor I’d 
like to provide an exegesis of Hart’s ideas. However, since in the entire first and 
large parts of the second chapter, the author exclusively engages critically with 
Hart’s paper, we should pause for a moment and remind ourselves what Hart’s 
original idea was. 
 
B. The Zero Hour for Defeasibility 
In his ground-breaking paper on defeasibility and legal exceptions, titled ‘The 
Ascription of Responsibility and Rights’, Hart drew the attention of the legal, 
and as it turned out, of the philosophical and scientific community to a language 
game, where the central component is the word ‘unless’.24 The conjunction Hart 
qualifies as ‘indispensable’ for natural languages on the one hand and a 
‘characteristic of legal concepts’ on the other hand has the function of rebutting 
a claim. Hart had stumbled upon a peculiarity of legal concepts. Hart observed 
that by providing an account of all necessary conditions of a legally binding 
(valid) contract, we won’t make a law student understand what a ‘contract’ 
really is. For she still has to learn what ‘can defeat a claim that there is a valid 
contract, even though all these conditions are satisfied’.25 There are two ways 
distinctive in their presuppositions in which legal utterances can be challenged. 
First, one can deny the accusation or the claim of her opponent. More 
specifically, she can deny some or all of the positive conditions– in the case of a 
(valid) contract, these are: at least two parties, an offer by one of them, 
acceptance by the other, in some cases a memorandum in writing and 
consideration.26 However, this is just one side of the coin, Hart contends. These 
 
22 As Hart (Sugarman and Hart (n 14) 276), stresses about his paper: “There were some things which were quite 
useful and true in it, but I think there was a central mistake. I claimed that the statement that a person has done 
an action is not a description but an ascription – let's say, a way of saying it’s your responsibility. And I think 
that’s wrong”. 
23 Hart, ‘The Ascription of Responsibility and Rights’ (n 10) 171–194. 
24 Ibid, at 174. The general importance of Hart’s remarks lies in the fact that they initiated a debate, which in turn 
gave birth to a whole new area of logic; see D Nute, ‘Preface’ in D Nute (ed), Defeasible Deontic Logic (Kluwer 
Academic Publishers, 1997) vii. 
25 Ibid, 174–5. 
26 Ibid, 174–5. 
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conditions, ‘although necessary, are not always sufficient’27 since there is more 
than one way to challenge the accusations or claims ‘upon which law courts 
adjudicate’.28 Besides a denial of facts, there is a way for which (back then) no 
term existed29 and which is  
‘quite different: namely, a plea that although the circumstances are present on which a claim 
could succeed, yet in the particular case, the claim or accusation should not succeed because 
the other circumstances are present, which brings the case under some recognised head of 
exception’.30 
Any concept is ‘defeasible’ if its application is subject to this kind of defeat. 
In the core of this argument lies Hart’s attempt to modify the point of view 
from which we approach legal problems. The concept of defeasibility was born 
as a research topic in this very moment. And the conjunction ‘unless’ is its 
linguistic expression. 
 
3. The Unity of Law 
 
A. Setting the Stage 
Duarte d’Almeida finds Hart’s approach ‘misguided in many respects’ (7). He 
seems to suggest that Hart was fighting with his hands tied. For he was 
‘constantly chasing an intuitively appealing but as yet diffuse and slippery 
thought about exceptions in law’ (7-8).31 Therefore, Duarte d’Almeida sets on an 
intellectual quest to carve out Hart’s actual claim. Hart, he argues, brought 
forward the argument that whenever the definiendum happens to be a defeasible 
concept, the theoretical model of a definition in terms of a set of necessary and 
sufficient conditions is logically inappropriate (11). According to Duarte 
d’Almeida, the conclusion Hart was trying to defend can be expressed by the 
following proposition: 
 
 (T1*) Defeasible concepts cannot be defined in terms of a set of necessary and 
 sufficient conditions. (11) 
 
But T1*, Duarte d’Almeida demurs, is diffusely expressed (17). Why on earth, 
he seems to lament, would Hart want to define any legal term, such as 
‘contract’, or embark on any other lexicographical endeavour? For if we, the 
argument goes on, take Hart by his own words, we conclude that he was 
concerned with the ‘actual procedure of the courts’ and particularly with the 
 
27 Ibid, 175. 
28 Ibid, 174. 
29 Ibid, 175. 
30 Ibid, 174; Hart is in this point not just reluctant, but to a certain extent opposed to using the term ’negative 
condition’ in order to describe this phenomenon. He writes: „The words ‘conditional’ and ‘negative’ have the 
wrong implications, but the law has a word which with some hesitation I borrow and extend: this is the word 
‘defeasible’” (175). 
31 We should not forget that Hart himself talks (Ibid, 175) about a practice for which back then no word existed. 
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‘judge’s function… in a case of contract’,32 but not ‘with the explanation or 
definition of concepts’ (12). That motivates Duarte d’Almeida to dig slightly 
deeper and excavate Hart’s substantial claim: 
 
 (T3) Defeating circumstances are not reducible to necessary conditions of 
 correct judgments. (17)33 
 
Duarte d’Almeida calls ‘T3’ the ‘irreducibility thesis’. And, rather naturally, he 
feels inclined to discuss the two following questions in the next two chapters: 
(1) Is the irreducibility thesis right? 
(2) How does it relate to the claim of ‘T1*’ that no set of necessary and 
sufficient conditions of a correct judgement J can be specified when the 
correctness of J depends on the non-emergence of defeating circumstances (13, 
17-18)? 
Let us pause here for a second. We have seen in section I.2 that Hart’s 
line of thoughts can, indeed must, be seen in the light of Oxford Ordinary 
Language Philosophy.34 His philosophical background warrants the conclusion 
that the negation of the ‘irreducibility thesis’ is not false but nonsensical. Hart 
offers a new question rather than a new answer.35 The ‘per genus and differentia 
specifica’ approach fails–not only for Hart, but for large parts of analytic 
philosophy–not just for defeasible concepts but as a philosophical tool, due to its 
commitment to essentialism (see section 1.A). Concepts in general–and not only 
defeasible ones–cannot be intelligibly defined in terms of a set of necessary and 
sufficient conditions. Furthermore, essentialism and more specifically the idea 
that what a proposition tells us is shown by its accordance with some logical 
syntax (such as ‘T3’)–Duarte d’Almeida embarks on an expedition to the 
discovery of the logical form of an individual norm allowing for exceptions 
throughout his whole book–echoes the Tractatus doctrine, according to which 
formal logic is something sublime. Wittgenstein’s rejection of his own older 
concept elicited Hart’s philosophical background. What I want to suggest here is 
that Hart, among others, would treat the irreducibility thesis as a meaningless 
philosophical dogma that fails the requirements of bipolarity (the ability to be 
both negated and asserted). It is true that exceptions are not reducible to 
necessary conditions of defeasible decisions. But actually, nothing is! 
I think that Duarte d’Almeida fails to understand what Hart was up to 
when he was trying to define a ‘contract’. Hart examined the grammar of 
 
32 Hart, ‘The Ascription of Responsibility and Rights’ (n 10) 178, 182. 
33 Duarte d’Almeida arrives at T3 through a series of inferential steps, which I cannot go after here. 
34 It is noteworthy that Hart begins his paper with the following words: “There are in our ordinary language 
sentences whose primary function […]” – My emphasis (Hart, ‘The Ascription of Responsibility and Rights’ (n 
10) 1). 
35 Cf. GP Baker, ‘Defeasibility and Meaning’ in PMS Hacker and J Raz (eds), Law, Morality and Society: 
Essays in Honour of H.L.A. Hart (Clarendon Press, 1977) 26. 
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defeasible concepts as something grounded on regularities of human behaviour, 
such as the (rule-governed) use of a ‘contract’. He thus brought ‘words back 
from their metaphysical to their everyday use’ by examining the language game 
of contracts (or legal defences) in the context of the actual court procedures, 
which is their ‘original home’.36 We conclude that Hart’s philosophy of action 
(asking what it means to utter the sentence ‘He did it’ or ‘this is a valid 
contract’)–problematic as it may have been–is a function of his philosophy of 
language where meaning is conceived as rule-governed use. The detachment of 
his oeuvre from its philosophical premises created this confusion. 
 
B. P-facts and D-facts 
However, this has not been the only focus of the book’s first chapter. Duarte 
d’Almeida manifests very early that he does not intend to reside with one or 
another of the received accounts of legal defences–for very good reasons. For 
both the incorporationists (who claim that the negation of each admissible 
exception is itself a condition of a correct decision (14)) and the non-deductivists 
(who stress the non-monotonic character of legal reasoning) are based on a 
presupposition–common to both sides of the dispute–that can easily be 
challenged. 
This common theoretical platform is the acknowledgement of positive and 
negative conditions for a (correct) legal decision. Duarte d’Almeida objects and 
effectively brushes the entire argument aside. He remarks that both the elements 
of, say, a crime (P-facts), and the possible legal defences (D-facts), can be 
contingent on a rather deliberate decision of the lawmaker. They can be both: 
positive or negative conditions. The insight on the other side, which Hart’s 
paper did offer, is that defeaters (propositions that can defeat a claim) are 
somehow ‘quite different’ in their function from the elements that are normally 
required in order to establish a crime. So the distinction between elements that 
have to be present and the admissible defeaters transcends the boundaries drawn 
by the distinction between positive and negative conditions. The point is, as the 
author contends, ‘that this contrast doesn’t map onto any distinction between 
positive and negative conditions’; for ‘P-facts and D-facts can be either positive 
or negative’ (p. 15). The importance of this remark cannot be overstated. Let’s 
memorise at this point that the author coins his new terms by naming the facts 
that need to be ‘present’37 for a claim to be successful ‘P-facts’ and the facts that 
can defeat a claim ‘D-facts’.38 The latter term draws our attention to 
defeasibility–Hart’s original topic. 
 
 
36 Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations (n 17) § 162. 
37 Hart, ‘The Ascription of Responsibility and Rights’ (n 10) 174. 
38 As Duarte d’Almeida remarks at page 50, ‘“P” stands for the conjunction (P1 and P2 and…Pn) of those 
elements whose presence is required for the judge’s decision, and “D” stands for the disjunction (D1 and D2 
and… Dn) of the admissible exceptions’. 
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C. Filtering Out The Noise 
“Defeasibility” is a perennial topic in legal theory.39 The term is widely used and 
referred to by legal scholars who argue that it is a key element towards a better 
understanding of legal argumentation. But the term “defeasible” is often 
convoluted, confused, and misinterpreted. And every (legal) scholar feels 
uncomfortable in a situation in which the same term signifies different concepts; 
when its semantics are not fixed. Therefore, Duarte d’Almeida devotes some 
space to filtering out the noise, before the second part of his book (ch 3-6), by 
deploying his own theoretical approach. I will get back to this point later. 
 The first use of ‘defeasible’ is the one which ‘tracks the non-final 
character of some of our decisions and judgments’ (23).40 Admittedly, leading 
scholars in the field of default logic admit that ‘the relationship between default 
and non-monotonic logics appears to be complex’.41 Yet, Duarte d’Almeida 
explains in a convincing way that the notion of a defeasible judgement, in the 
legal field or otherwise, is not intrinsically connected to non-finality–this is what 
he calls ‘defeasibleNF’ (27). For fallibility does not seem to grasp the main 
function of defeasible concepts, namely to rebut certain claims – this is what 
Duarte d’Almeida calls ‘“defeasibleP” (for defeasibility proper)’ (27-28). 
DefeasibilityNF and defeasibilityP are held to be independent properties (29). 
This is a very helpful remark. New information acquired at tn+1 may force us to 
revise the judgment we made at tn (eg it was B–and not A, as we used to believe–
who killed C). However, the distinctive function of defeaters is a different one. 
The body of information at tn+1 may remain intact, but the claim can still be 
defeated (eg A killed B, but he acted in self-defence). The proposition “A killed 
C” remains true but misses its target. In other words: non-finality is a feature of 
the concept “(fallible) knowledge”, whereas defeasibilityp is a procedural 
element allowing for utterances which ‘are admitted as defeating circumstances’ 
(30). 
 While the first step to reduce noise is successful, the next steps are open to 
criticism, as I will show. Hart is being accused of relating defeasibility to 
questions of meaning, such as the term ‘contract’ (35-36). Admittedly, Duarte 
d’Almeida is right to say that defeasibility is not a problem of semantics but an 
epistemic one: A change in validity conditions does not affect the meaning of 
“valid contract”. It affects only (or may affect) which contracts may count as 
valid in which system’ (39). However, Hart would be the first one to 
acknowledge that (default) logic ‘does not prescribe interpretation of terms; it 
dictates neither the stupid nor intelligent interpretation of an expression. Logic 
 
39 Cf. DN Walton, Argumentation Methods for Artificial Intelligence in Law (Springer -Verlag Berlin 
Heidelberg, 2005) 75–114; JF Beltrán and GB Ratti, ‘Legal Defeasibility: An Introduction’ in JF Beltrán and GB 
Ratti (eds) The Logic of Legal Requirements: Essays on Defeasibility (Oxford University Press, 2012) 1. 
40 See Walton (n 39) 75. He suggests that “a defeasible argument […] is one in which the premises, relative to 
the given information, support the conclusion, even though new information may defeat the argument.” 
41 R Reiter, ‘A Logic for Default Reasoning’ (1980) 13 Artificial Intelligence 81. 
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only tells you hypothetically that if you give a certain term a certain 
interpretation then a certain conclusion follows’.42 For the rules upon which 
(default) logic operates are, at the same time, the rules that govern the use of a 
word, its meaning. Again: Duarte d’Almeida understands meaning as a 
lexicographical inquiry while Hart understands it as rule-governed use. 
 Duarte d’Almeida continues and points out that defeasibility is neither 
about meaning nor about concepts since the judge’s function is not to apply any 
concept but to come to a decision. This is the case ‘when all P-facts are present 
and no D-fact emerges’ (39): To suggest, as Hart does, that a defeasible 
proposition such as ‘there is a contract’ could possibly issue an individual norm 
(ie to say that ‘defeasible decisions can be described as being decisions to the 
effect that ‘“there is an x”’ (40)) conceals in Duarte d’Almeida’s opinion the 
normative conditions of a correct decision. 
Admittedly, this should have attracted a fair amount of criticism if Hart 
had committed the error of treating the phrase ‘there is an x’ in ‘a purely 
descriptive sense’.43 But for him–as for Wittgenstein44 and Austin45–words are 
deeds. By saying that ‘there is a contract’, Hart is not reporting a fact. The token 
judgement, ‘there is a contract’, is a performative utterance, (eg leading to award 
damages for the breach of (a valid) contract, and not the set of normative 
conditions for that utterance). In that sense, defeasibility is about concepts 
insofar as it enables us to describe their normative structure. 
 
D. The Proof-Based Account 
Any discussion about D-facts (defeasibility) is contingent upon them being 
irreducible to P-facts–otherwise, it would be a truism or a violation of the 
principle of the economy of thought to use two distinct terms for two identical 
objects. Therefore, it has to be shown that these two propositional sets behave in 
different ways, so that a defendant who denies that (at least) one of the relevant 
P-facts is present is doing something quite different from the one who admits all 
relevant facts, but offers a defence instead. This also means that the absence of 
P-facts is different from the absence of D-facts.46 Only this idea seems to lie 
behind Duarte d’Almeida’s remarks, and I think it is useful to quote in full: ‘one 
is accepting that absence of self-defence is not something that has to be 
ascertained for someone to be properly convicted of murder, while absence of 
consent does have to be ascertained to a given standard for someone to be 
properly convicted of rape” (132). In other words: absence of proof (of legal 
exceptions), is for all procedural uses, a proof of absence thereof. 
 
42 HLA Hart, ‘Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals’ (1958) 71 Harvard Law Review 593. 
43 Hart, ‘The Ascription of Responsibility and Rights’ (n 10) 187. 
44 See eg Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations (n 17) § 546. 
45 JL Austin, ‘Performative Utterances’ in JO Urmson and GJ Warnock (eds), Philosophical Papers (Oxford 
University Press, 1979) ch 10. 
46 See page 50-1 of the book for more discussion. 
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Duarte d’Almeida senses that (at least according to the received view, ie 
the ‘substantive representation’ (58) of facts) both P-facts and D-facts either 
depict a true state of the world or that they do not–tertium non datur. According 
to the received view, we care only about the actual events and not the evidence.47 
Duarte d’Almeida considers this view to be deeply flawed (59). He argues that 
(what we call) metaphysical realism will not get us far in a legal (ie procedural) 
context. This is insofar correct as legal adjudication can, and indeed must, be 
understood as procedurally structured reasoning under uncertainty. Of course it 
is crucial to guarantee a ‘reasonable congruence between verdicts of guilty and 
factual guilt’,48 but as legal evidence scholars remark, ‘how is the court to see 
that A really did kill B?’49 Fact finders are (by definition) not omniscient gods, 
and metaphysical realism in conjunction with the substantive representation of 
facts only makes sense if we adopt a god’s eye view.50 Furthermore, we should 
not forget that (at least) legal theory seeks to articulate legal systems in their full 
complexity. Once we realise that we have to deploy and validate large sectors of 
a legal order–otherwise we are talking about a ‘helter-skelter of uncoordinated 
individual norms’51–in order to make a single decision, most of our theoretical 
illusions disappear.52 
Duarte d’Almeida’s approach is not only theoretically consistent but also 
descriptively accurate. Finding legal evidence with a probative force is a way of 
establishing guilt or liability, not the other way around. Both legal masterminds, 
Hans Kelsen and HLA Hart, unequivocally agree on that issue.53 They argue that 
we cannot impose external criteria on the assessment of a judge’s/fact-trier’s 
epistemic performance. Defendants (and not perpetrators or law-abiding 
citizens) are being convicted because an authorised court has ascertained in a 
procedure determined by the legal order that a certain individual has committed 
a crime.54 In other words: fact finders are not convinced of the defendant’s guilt 
because the latter is guilty as a matter of fact. Quite the opposite is the case. 
Defendants are convicted because fact finders are convinced that they are ‘guilty 
as charged’. To say that the decision was ‘wrong’ only because, the defendant 
 
47 See C Nesson, ‘The Evidence or the Event? On Judicial Proof and the Acceptability of Verdicts’ (1985) 98(7) 
Harvard Law Review 1357, where he stresses that it is a psychological need that predisposes us to accept the 
verdict of guilt or liability as a statement about the past event. 
48 For more discussion, see P Roberts, ‘Renegotiating Forensic Cultures’ (2013) 44(1) Studies in History and 
Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 47–59. 
49 HL Ho, A Philosophy of Evidence Law (Oxford University Press, 2008) 57. 
50 See A Goldman, Knowledge in a Social World (Oxford University Press 1999) ch 9. 
51 W Ebenstein, ‘The Pure Theory of Law: Demythologizing Legal Thought’ (1971) 59(3) California Law 
Review 637. 
52 One of these misconceptions is the idea that eg self-defence is an exception to a rule. The argument, Duarte 
d’Almeida contends, that there is some ruleD (eg self-defence) permitting us not to apply some other relevant 
ruleR (eg killing someone) is created only because of a ‘conceptual and terminological blunder’ (163). 
53 See H Kelsen, Allgemeine Theorie der Normen (Manz 1979) 195; Hart, ‘The Concept of Law‘ (n 6) 138. 
54 H Kelsen, Pure Theory of Law trans. M Knight (University of California Press, 2nd.edn 1967) 239-40. 
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did not kill the victim in reality, ‘has no consequences within the system’, as 
Hart observes.55 
Duarte d’Almeida stresses that the substantive representation of legal 
rules (exceptions included) allows–through the external parameter of absolute 
facts–for the claim that the rule of criminal law stipulates the obligation to 
punish only ‘those who have committed murder’ (61-62). But since there are no 
self-evident facts, he remarks that it is the view of the authorised judge and not 
of an omniscient god that ascribes truth values to the factual claims uttered in a 
(criminal) court (58). Legal orders attach legal consequences not to a fact in 
itself, but only to facts validated by their triers in a procedure prescribed by the 
legal order.56 
This insight enables Duarte d’Almeida to come to a warranted conclusion. 
P-facts and D-facts follow the same logico-grammatical rules, but only if we 
examine them from a metaphysical (substantive) perspective, which excludes 
uncertainty. Therefore, we have to change our perspective and operate not with 
absolute facts, such as X–which in reality can be either true or false–but with the 
following fourfold range of possibilities: 
    
   i. X is proved. 
   ii. Not-X is proved.  
   iii. X is not proved. 
   iv. Not-X is not proved. (53) 
 
Introducing the ‘proof-based account’ (52) is a decisive move. Legal 
consequences are not contingent on self-revealing facts, but on some 
procedurally structured method of knowledge-claim validation. As Duarte 
d’Almeida remarks, a ‘fact can be said to be proved (or not), in the legal sense of 
the notion, only by reference to some standard of proof legally set for it’ (107). 
Read against the 2x2 matrix depicted above, the idea that the absence of a P-fact 
(see iii.) is radically different from the absence of a D-fact (iv.) appears to be 
utterly convincing (74). For example, the absence of one of the probanda hinges 
on different conditions and brings different legal consequences than the absence 
of one of the admissible exceptions. In that sense, Duarte d’Almeida contends 
that the following formulation is ‘an apt rendition of the sufficient conditions of 
defeasible decisions’ (p. 83) (ie the logical form of a defeasible decision): 
 




55 Hart, ‘The Concept of Law‘ (n 6) 141. 
56 See H Kelsen, What is Justice?: Justice, Law, and Politics in the Mirror of Science (University of California 
Press, 1957) 252. 
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So Duarte d’Almeida chooses to articulate the logical form of defeasible 
decisions through an ‘if x, then y’ relation, as a conditional–rather inconsistently, 
since he uses both conditionals and biconditionals (eg 55, 57, 74), alas without 
explaining the difference. It must be stressed that Duarte d’Almeida aspires to 
describe the judge’s activity in logico-mechanical terms and ‘come up with 
some combination of statements of law and statements of fact that deductively 
justifies’ the decision (52). However, the idea of using conditionals in order to 
put the deductive machinery in motion is not a good one. For logical relations, 
which we are by no means bound to accept in natural language, become valid 
within the logical framework described above.57 Duarte d’Almeida is aware of 
these consequences and tries to defend his model against criticism by explicitly 
abstaining ‘from commenting on how our natural language conditionals ought 
ultimately to be interpreted’ (19). Yet, this move is not convincing. Given the 
author’s commitment to deductive inferences and necessarily true conclusions, 
and given that only formal logic could support such a machinery, we conclude 
that Duarte d’Almeida’s own methodology invalidates his disclaimer. In 
jurisprudence as in life, you can’t have the cake and eat it too. In other words: 
either a model is a closed system based on logical deductions, but then one has 
to apply the grammar of formal languages (determinacy of language); or a 
model is not a closed system, since it allows semantics, but then any claim for 
deductivity is unwarranted. 
 At the same time, Duarte d’Almeida makes one more unwarranted move. 
He wants to make clear that he ‘does not endorse Kelsen’s view’ concerning the 
correctness of a legal decision.58 Such a decision is, as Duarte d’Almeida 
remarks, based on the application of legal rules, and, of course, judges (or more 
generally, fact-finders) ‘may fail to apply these rules correctly’ (61).59 They may 
 
57 See Wittgenstein, ‘Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus’ (n 12) § 5.101. In order to examine whether it is helpful 
to treat defeasible decisions in accordance with the logical syntax of conditionals (if x, then y), we just have to 
take a look at their truth table: 
x y x→y 
1 1 1 
1 0 0 
0 1 1 
0 0 1 
Table 1.1 
Among other things, we see that by using the conditional (→) as a canon of argumentation, we have the 
following situation: If the consequent (y) is true, the antecedent (x) can be either true or false (ex falso sequitur 
quodlibet: from falsehood, anything follows), see Table 1.1, lines 1 and 3. Hence, trying to formalise legal norms 
as ‘if-then’ relations will mean that even if eg the fact-trier imposes a legal consequence – although someone’s 
behaviour does not instantiate the elements of a crime –, we still have a valid relation (see Table 1.1, line 3). This 
contradicts our most basic intuition about the meaning of normativity or what it means to follow a rule. This is 
one of the reasons why legal scholars traditionally treat the logical relation between eg ‘guilt’ and ‘innocence’ as 
biconditional, ie a bi-directional implication. 
58 As we saw above (see section III.3) this is not only Kelsen’s view, but Hart’s as well. 
59 My Emphasis. 
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‘declare that some fact is proved when according to the relevant rules it should 
not be considered proved, or vice versa’ (62). Duarte d’Almeida admits that 
such a judicial decision will be ‘valid’. However, he says that it will not be 
‘legally correct’ (50, 52). Now, the question is: whose point of view is relevant 
for deciding on the ‘correctness’ of a decision? Aren’t we almost by definition 
assuming that the judge has reached a conclusion or the trier of facts has applied 
a legal rule in a way she deemed–here, I use Duarte d’Almeida’s terminology–
‘legally correct’? Here, we catch Duarte d’Almeida in flagranti using double 
standards. He is a relativist when examining knowledge claims, whereas he is a 
realist when discussing legal norms. This is a striking asymmetry. While he does 
not allow the external criterion of “objective truth” to supersede the epistemic 
performance of a fact-finder, he does allow the external criterion of ‘legal 
correctness’ to supersede the legal decision of an authorised judge or the 
application of a rule, (necessarily) based on somebody’s point of view. This is a 
severe error, yet on a side point of Duarte d’Almeida’s book. 
 
E. Economy of Thought 
On top of this, Duarte d’Almeida is right in adding uncertainty to the mix and 
reminding us that the ‘substantive’ approach is flawed because it is anything but 
a scaled-down version of the judicial phenomenon. He argues that defeasibility 
in law is ‘a by-product of the need to reach a decision in the face of uncertainty 
about the occurrence of relevant facts’ (184). Here, we can identify one more 
major pressure point in his analysis. As already mentioned above (III.2), 
defeasibility cannot be reduced to fallibility. Every real-life decision is a 
judgement under uncertainty. But defeasibility does more than that. It is about 
making decisions whenever we have absolutely no information about the 
acceptable defeaters. We ascertain by default that A killed B, even if we have no 
information about A being in self-defence; accordingly, we ascertain that Tweety 
(a random bird) can fly even if we have no information about Tweety being a 
penguin or an ostrich,60 even if we cannot exclude the defeaters who have 
gained membership to a previously known set of defeaters. Hence, we can issue 
an individual norm whenever all elements (P-facts) have been ascertained unless 
a defeater (D-fact) comes into play. 
 The problem I want to raise here is related to the necessity of this 
discussion. Raymond Reiter, the founder of default logic, makes clear that 
default logic does not aim at modelling a non-monotonic information-acquiring 
process such as, in Duarte d’Almeida’s terms, DefNF. The patterns of inference 
in scope, he says, are quite different and have the form ‘in the absence of any 
information to the contrary, assume …’.61 And default logic (ie the theoretical 
 
60 This is the famous example used from Reiter (Reiter (n 41) 82. 
61 Reiter (n 41) 81; for more discussion, see N Rescher, ‘Default Reasoning’ in DM Gabbay and P Thagard and J 
Woods (eds) Philosophy of Logic (Elsevier BV, 2007) 1167. 
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framework of defeasibility) offers us reasoning patterns for exactly this kind of 
situations in which we want to jump to conclusions unless, and until, one of the 
defeaters comes into play such as, in Duarte d’Almeida’s terms, DefP. 
 So the touchstone of default logic (which is Reiter’s seminal paper) did 
not receive Duarte d’Almeida’s attention. Of course, this is not a mala in se. But 
if we treat the economy of thought as a methodological axiom in academic 
research, Duarte d’Almeida’s omission automatically becomes a mala prohibita. 
And the more emphasis we put on the economy of thought, the harsher the 
criticism becomes. In his book, Duarte d’Almeida starts over to create a new 
theory of defeasibility pretty much from scratch, although default logic, 
originally presented in Reiter’s paper, provides formal methods to support just 
this kind of reasoning.62 Duarte d’Almeida’s move is unnecessary, forbidden 
indeed. 
 
F. What About the Burden of Proof? 
We have seen above that Duarte d’Almeida’s whole project boils down to the 
conceptual formula (13P) discussed above. The latter hinges on P-facts and D-
facts having been proved and not just on facts in themselves. Thus, the strictly 
legal point of view is crucial: In order to discern which facts are exceptions 
relative to some decision type, ‘we need to look at what facts must and must not 
be ascertained for the decision to be correct’ (122). 
 This brings us to the next issue concerning the question of who is required 
to prove what. Duarte d’Almeida feels obliged to address possible criticism 
deriving from the doctrinal learning on burdens of proof. Since he goes to great 
lengths discussing these issues, I will focus on only two of these possible 
objections. First, the critics could object that the model seems to disregard that 
if the defendant succeeded in making an exception a ‘live issue’, it becomes the 
plaintiff’s/prosecutor’s job to disprove the exception. In other words, the burden 
of proof shifts back and forth and the model fails to grasp and explain this shift. 
Second, the model ignores that the ‘burden’ carried by the plaintiff/prosecutor 
relative to D-facts is quite different from the burden relative to P-facts (83-85). 
Duarte d’Almeida manages to show that these objections are grounded on 
presuppositions that are mistaken. First of all, he makes clear that in case the 
defendant offers evidence for some exception, the plaintiff or the prosecutor will 
undoubtedly be required to offer counter-evidence. But this is a matter of 
procedural tactics (94). From a strictly legal point of view, Duarte d’Almeida 
suggests nothing changes since the only thing a plaintiff or prosecutor must 
prove are P-facts–which in cases like these are simply not sufficient for them to 
win the case. For ‘winning’ or ‘losing’ are predicates of personal, not legal 
interest. In other words, there is “no legal obligation proper for any procedural 
 
62 For an application of a default-deontic language (M3D) on legal presumptions see K Kotsoglou, ‘Zur Theorie 
gesetzlicher Vermutungen. Beweislast oder Defeasibility?’ (2014) 45(2) Rechtstheorie 243. 
Appeared in: 8 Transational Legal Theory (2017), Vol. 8, pp. 119–145 
17 
 
party to ‘discharge’ her ‘burden’ (89). Examining the burden of proof or the 
procedural tactics of any given party would take us away from legal or 
procedural theory to psychology and decision theory. And Duarte d’Almeida’s 
model does not examine the ways of success for any procedural party, but the 
conditions of correctness for a legal decision. 
 In order to dissolve the problem of a distinction between a burden of proof 
and a ‘mere evidential burden’ (p. 94), Duarte d’Almeida investigates the 
grammar of exceptions. After working out that the (legal) standard of proof is a 
‘minimum threshold that has to be met’ (109), he stresses that ‘the complement 
of a threshold is not in itself another threshold that has to (or even can) be met’ 
(109). As we have seen above, the absence of proof is a proof of absence, but 
only for D-facts–not for P-facts. D-facts will not bother the trier of fact unless 
they become a live issue. In that sense, the plaintiff/prosecutor still carries the 
burden of ‘ensuring that no defence–no exception–is actually proved’ (117). The 
question whether the burden of proof relative to justifications should be placed 
on the defendant is ‘unintelligible and unanswerable’ (133). 
 Duarte d’Almeida’s analysis is consistent and convincing. He manages to 
silence these types of arguments effectively. Yet I want to briefly highlight a 
slightly different issue. According to the received view, the role of the burden of 
proof within the framework of adversary trial is to ‘break the logjam and 
overcome the stalemate’63 in case of a tie (non-liquet).64 Bearing in mind that the 
burden of proof will address the question about what will be proved by whom, 
we conclude that, for example, the Presumption of Innocence (PoI), is the 
burden of proof in criminal procedure law, since it inter alia states that it is the 
duty of the prosecutor to prove all elements of the crime. Hence, the PoI in 
criminal procedure law is not just about breaking the logjam. It makes it 
logically impossible to have a non-liquet situation, since it instructs the fact-
triers to acquit, unless the legal proof is obtained (beyond a reasonable doubt). 
What I am trying to say is that it would make sense to apply the methodological 
tools provided by the model (P- and D-facts) to unravel the mysteries of the PoI 
as well as the legal presumptions of fact in general, which in turn would also 
dissolve the problem of the burden of proof.65 Working out the element of 
defeasibility from the PoI would offer an explanation that avoids subjective 
terms like decision in favour of the defendant or the plaintiff, litigation tactics 
etc. That would be (more) consistent with Duarte d’Almeida’s methodological 
assumptions, namely to adopt a strictly legal point of view.66 
 
63 P Roberts and A Zuckerman, Criminal Evidence (Oxford University Press, 2nd edn 2010) 224. 
64 Burdens of proof, even for many of the scholars, who operate with them, cannot shift; see Roberts and 
Zuckerman (n 63) 220. 
65 Admittedly, this approach is confined only to the realm of criminal law, leaving outside of its explanatory 
power the civil process. 
66 See H Kelsen, ‘”Foreword” to the Second Printing of Main Problems in the Theory of Public Law’ in SL 
Paulson and B L Paulson (eds), Normativity and Norms: Critical Perspectives on Kelsenian Themes (Oxford 




G. On Explicit and Implicit Exceptions 
There is another problem concerning the explanatory power of the model, 
Duarte d’Almeida admits. ‘So far we have been concerned with so-called 
“explicit” exceptions only’ (135); facts that have been classified as exceptions as 
a matter of general law, like self-defence, duress etc. This seems to cause an 
explanatory gap that needs to be filled. ‘Implicit’ exceptions67 (in which the 
decision involves an exercise of discretionary judgment) can be identified as 
such only in an individual case, namely, as ‘facts not previously identified or 
identifiable as such’ 137). Therefore, we need to examine whether implicit 
exceptions can also be accounted for in proof-based terms. 
 The problem with implicit exceptions, Duarte d’Almeida contends, is that 
we can only have an open-ended list thereof: ‘There is no closed list of the 
circumstances that classify as exceptions under this provision’ (137). This could 
be seen as a threat to Duarte d’Almeida’s model: ‘Whenever implicit exceptions 
are allowed, we may know the applicable legal rule, know what the relevant 
standards of proof are, and know exactly what facts have and have not been 
ascertained […] and we still won’t be able to tell what the correct decision 
should be’ (138). Rather naturally, he deploys a strategy in order to solve this 
problem. Yet, does this argument really pose a threat? Again, Duarte d’Almeida 
worries about the problem concerning ‘implicit exceptions’, where we–at least 
seemingly–have a gap between rules and their applications because there is no 
explicitly formulated list of the circumstances that classify as exceptions under a 
certain provision. 
 I think that the real question is: do we in (legal) language ever have such a 
closed list of circumstances? Isn’t it the case that the judge has to exercise 
judicial discretion, even in circumstances in which she has to decide whether 
some particular facts qualify an ‘explicit’ exception (eg self-defence)? No matter 
how big the similarities are, the judge will still have to ‘add to a line of cases a 
new case because of resemblances which can reasonably be defended as both 
legally relevant and sufficiently close’.68 In other words: isn’t the so-called 
‘rule-following problem’69 – derived from the insight that rules can never dictate 
their own application–equally applicable to ‘explicit’ and ‘implicit’ exceptions? 
Of course, the discretional power a judge must apply in order ‘to pick out easily 
 
University Press, 1998), 3–22, where he criticizes the legal scholars for factoring in psychological elements such 
as (dis)advantage etc. He observes that this is a ‘questionable heritage, taken over from the theory of Roman 
advocacy jurisprudence, which considers the law only from the standpoint of the subjectively interested party, 
only from the perspective of whether and to what extent this law is “my” law’. 
67 Although Duarte d’Almeida’s does not agree with the used terminology, he chooses–thankfully–not to 
introduce one more time his own notation. 
68 Hart, ‘The Concept of Law’ (n 6) 127 – My Emphasis. 
69 See Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations (n 177) § 138–242. For a comprehensive introduction to the 
problem of rule-following see M McGinn, Routledge Philosophy GuideBook to Wittgenstein and the 
Philosophical Investigations (Routledge, 1997) 73–112. 
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recognizable instances’70 is not the same for explicit and implicit exceptions–
albeit the difference is in degree and not in kind. Even for ‘explicit’ exceptions, 
we can, indeed must, anticipate situations in which new, previously unanswered 
questions arise. Unlike formal logic (which ‘takes care of itself’71) rules, 
linguistic or legal rules do not dictate their own application. The necessity of 
judgement is present even if we have the illusion that we ‘automatically’ apply 
the law to facts, since non-standard cases will perforce arise.72 Since legal rules–
no matter how precise–are intimately bound up with facts, and facts are 
infinitely variable, we will unavoidably end up being entangled in the 
unpredictability of ‘our own rules’,73 always in need of a decision, even in cases 
of rules including ‘explicitly formulated catalogue of admissible exceptions’ 
(135).74 For the legal evidence in question or the conceptual/doctrinal logical 
framework cannot speak up and say ‘I am a legal exception for the purposes of 
this rule’.75 
 The fact that legal systems in an increasingly complex world are unable to 
anticipate the future and contain rules allowing for exceptions incapable of 
exhaustive statements is a historic lesson we have learnt at least since the 
Prussian Legal Code (1794) with its more than 20,000 paragraphs. In a 
constantly evolving world characterised by a radically unpredictable future, 
every codification–no matter how thorough or voluminous–would be in need of 
radical revision moments after its enactment in order to catch the multitude of 
situations that can occur in real life.76 Only if we could anticipate all possible 
combinations of fact, Hart observes, open texture would be an unnecessary 
feature of rules.77 However, such knowledge is neither possible nor intelligible. 
As Hart explains, how extensive a use the legislator will make of implicit 
exceptions, depends on a compromise between the social need for legal certainty 
and the flexibility of the law.78 
 Let me recapitulate: The fact that rules, in general, have exceptions ‘not 
exhaustively specifiable in advance’79 is a function of the ‘open texture’80 of 
language, an ineliminable feature of language–not of a rather arbitrary 
distinction between explicit and implicit exceptions. Duarte d’Almeida is 
unknowingly dealing not with a theory of defeasibility (ie a logical framework 
for default reasoning), but rather with a quasi-theory of meaning. The property 
 
70 Hart, ‘The Concept of Law’ (n 6) 127. After all, one should also think if it is easier to bring a particular case x 
under ‘self-defence’? A short look at the vast literature will, at least, give us a hint. 
71 Wittgenstein, ‘Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus’ (n 12) § 5.473. 
72 Hacker (n 13) 7; Hart, ‘The Concept of Law’ (n 6) 127. 
73 Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations (n 17) § 125. 
74 Hart, ‘The Concept of Law’ (n 6) 122. 
75 Cf. Hart, ‘Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals’ (n 42) 607. 
76 Cf. Hacker (n 13) 7. 
77 Hart, ‘The Concept of Law’ (n 6) 135. 
78 Ibid., 130. 
79 Ibid., 139. 
80 Ibid., 128. 
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of being an explicit or implicit exception is not a variable that could determine 
the correctness of the incorporationist strategy.81 Therefore, the extra mile the 
judge has to go when facing ‘implicit’ exceptions is an issue of semantics of the 
legal norms providing exceptions–not a problem of the cardinality of the set of 
the admissible exceptions. The particular case, such as a therapy dog called 
Pluto not previously identified as a legal exception to a rule (say, ‘No dogs 
allowed in this restaurant, unless special circumstances require it’), will not 
come into play as a ‘therapy dog’ per se (condicio sine qua non) but as an 
instantiation of an (necessarily) abstract legal rule allowing for exceptions 
(condicio per quam). The ‘and so on’ clause in implicit exceptions does not 
describe the dots of laziness but is a catalyst of adaptation to social change. In 
other words, the flexibility of legal rules’ semantics (their open-endedness) does 
not dissolve into an anything-goes mush, for their syntax is not fluid. And we in 
law are constantly facing not a structural problem, but one of (unstable) 
semantics. For many, as for Hart, this problem is ‘to be welcomed rather than 
deplored’,82 since it allows the law to adapt to constantly evolving new 
challenges by regulating the dynamic process of increasing (or decreasing) the 
concretisation and individualisation of legal rules. Indeterminacy is inherent in 
language: In all fields of experience, not only that of legal rules, there is a limit 
to the guidance general language can provide.83 If one is interested in a theory of 
defeasibility or exceptions, she shouldn’t worry about semantics, since ‘logic is 
silent on how to classify particulars’.84 Duarte d’Almeida is fighting against 
philosophical shadows once again. He gives the right answers. It’s just that the 
question is wrong. 
 
3. Defeasibility in Action 
 
A. Daily Contexts 
The third part (ch 7 and 8) of Duarte d’Almeida’s book provides a survey of the 
model’s possible applications. He wants to ‘put the proof-based account to the 
test’ (187). His target is the interplay of accusations and answers in extra-legal, 
everyday contexts (ch 7) as well as in legal, procedural contexts. 
 Duarte d’Almeida acknowledges that the endeavour of structuring non-
legal, everyday accusations, ‘which are not constrained by institutionalised 
evidentiary rules and standards and procedures of proof’ (210), is not easy a 
 
81 As Duarte d’Almeida remarks ‘If implicit exceptions are to be theorized in terms of overrides, then so are 
explicit ones. … Explicit and implicit exceptions, theoretically speaking, stand or fall together’ (162). 
82 Hacker (n 13) 7; the underlying principle of this idea is that language games facilitate communication, not 
despite but in consequence of the indeterminacy of their components (words). As Wittgenstein observes: ‘We 
want to walk [ie communicate]‚so we need friction [ie indeterminacy]. Back to the rough ground!’ (Wittgenstein, 
Philosophical Investigations (n 17) § 107). 
83 Hart, ‘The Concept of Law’ (n 6) 126. 
84 Hart, ‘Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals’ (n 42) 610. 
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task. In fact, it has been treated with scepticism from the very beginning.85 But 
to deny that everyday accusations or responsibility ascriptions are based on rules 
just because these rules are not explicit or institutionally scrutinised is, I think, 
to deny that those rules have meaning (ie a rule-governed use). An evaluation of 
this move goes far beyond the scope of the present study. The point I want to 
raise is a slightly different one. We have seen above how Duarte d’Almeida 
struggled to formulate the logical form of a defeasible decision (‘13P’). Now, 
and while it’s time to deliver (practical) results, Duarte d’Almeida discusses a 
new relevant but distinct philosophical issue: HLA Hart’s and J L Austin’s ideas 
on ascription of actions and responsibility. Of course, the topic is convoluted, 
relevant, and highly interesting. And there ‘is much to learn from the exercise’ 
indeed (187). But it’s not the time for learning. It’s time for action–‘defeasibility 
in action’ (185), as the author had previously adumbrated. I’m afraid that this 
procrastination is somehow irritating for the reader. Regardless of this criticism, 
I think that Duarte d’Almeida’s account passes the first test. In the domain of 
daily-life accusations, we do apply P-facts and D-facts. For the utterance ‘A did 
φ’ can, in an accusatory context, be answered in two different ways: either by 
denying its factual character or by offering an excuse/justification. Most 
importantly, we do not have to rule out all possible defeaters in order to accuse 
someone: ‘You dropped the tea-tray’ (194). 
 
B. Legal Contexts 
After having applied the theoretical framework to normal, daily contexts, Duarte 
d’Almeida endeavours on casting light on the fundamental distinction between 
offences and defences in a legal context (219). But before doing that, he wants 
to read the results of his model against the doctrinal analysis of a different legal 
tradition and thus narrow the gap, better say the ‘great chasm that separates the 
modern Continental legal system from the Anglo-American system’.86 In order 
to achieve this goal, he examines the ‘dominant Continental theoretical 
approach’ and attacks its flagship, the German doctrine of crime, 
‘Verbrechenslehre’, (219) in which the strict distinction between wrongfulness 
on the one hand and the issues of blameworthiness, on the other hand, is a 
feature of the model. 
But let me take things from the beginning. The fourth chapter (§§ 32-35) 
of the German Penal Code (GPC) contains both justificatory and exculpatory 
defences. However, after its enactment in 1871, a totally new concept was 
‘discovered’87: a supplementary doctrinal stage of analysis called ‘legal 
 
85 See Baker (n 35) 33. 
86 John Langbein, ‘Historical Foundations of the Law of Evidence: A View from the Ryder Sources’ (1996) 
96(5) Columbia Law Review 1168. 
87 For an elaborate discussion on the term ‘discovery’ in the context of German Jurisprudence see MD Dubber, 
‘The Promise of German Criminal Law: A Science of Crime and Punishment’ (2004) 6 German Law Journal 
1049. 
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wrongfulness’ (Rechtswidrigkeit), which led to the extraction of justificatory 
defences (such as self-defence) from the concept of guilt (Schuld) and factored 
them into the new concept of unlawfulness (Unrecht). The result was the so-
called ‘three-step analysis of criminal liability’.88 Now the question is: can the 
German tripartite model account for criminal defences on the one hand and 
what we call P- and D-facts on the other hand (220)–which is, as we have seen 
above, a basic feature of natural languages? 
Let us now go back to Duarte d’Almeida’s presentation of the tripartite 
model. First, the author says, the action of an agent must satisfy the description 
of a legally defined ‘Tatbestand’ (eg homicide, theft etc.). So far, so good, since 
the correspondence of an action or omission to some Tatbestand is ‘similar, in 
content and function, to the Anglo-American notion of a criminal offence’ 
(220). But of course, the correspondence of an action or omission to some 
criminal offence is not sufficient for it to count ‘as a criminal “Verbrechen89”’ 
(221). For there is a second element of the concept of ‘crime’, he reminds us; 
legal wrongfulness. Accordingly, an action shall not be deemed illegal although 
it corresponds to a specific ‘Tatbestand’ (eg if committed in self-defence. 
Finally, the condition of culpability is to be met. The reasons for Duarte 
d’Almeida’s discontent must have become obvious by now. How is it possible, 
he wonders, that a model operating with three (positive) elements, which have to 
be jointly ascertained, can incorporate defeating circumstances (p. 221)? His 
answer is straightforward: It cannot! The German model, he suggests, is treating 
legal wrongfulness as ‘some other definitional “element”’ (229), namely as 
something ‘that must be “present” for there to be a crime’ (228). Therefore, the 
German model is (according to his own one) conceptually confused. Duarte 
d’Almeida is echoing here the old (Hegelian) aphorism: “If the German legal 
order contradicts the ‘proof-based account’, the worse for the German legal 
order.” First, he contends, ‘whoever denies that absence of self-defence is 
required for a murder conviction to be correct makes a descriptive mistake about 
law’ (229). Second, the German model, the argument goes on, ‘conflates the 
object-level of constitutive facts and the meta-level of the theoretical notions 
introduced to account for certain interesting aspects of constitutive facts’ (229). 
 Let’s start our discussion with the second objection. Duarte d’Almeida 
seems to ignore that legal wrongfulness is not just a theoretical term–exclusively 
serving purposes of systematisation of the law; merely as a logical stage of legal 
analysis. Legal wrongfulness is much more than that, since it is an integral part 
of the law itself. For example, the culpability of the participant will be examined 
only if the act of the perpetrator is ‘legally wrongful’ (§§ 26, 27 GPC). 
 
88 It must be brought to attention that there is an extensive and vivid discussion going on concerning this 
analysis. Various criminal law theorists suggest the introduction even of a fourth step of analysis. 
89 Duarte d’Almeida is using here the wrong term ‘Verbrechen’, which translates into ‘serious offence’ (felony) 
and which leaves all the misdemeanors (‘Vergehen’, § 12(2) GPC) out. What he really means is ‘[Straf]Ttat’ (§ 1 
GPC), which is the general term and translates into ‘offence’. 
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 In order to tackle the first objection, we will need more space. Duarte 
d’Almeida stresses the fact that in German criminal procedure, defences are 
treated ‘very much like anywhere else’. German ‘[c]ourts do not need to satisfy 
themselves that the absence of each one of the admissible defences has been 
ascertained before they correctly convict someone’ (220). This insight warrants, 
as Duarte d’Almeida suggests, the conclusion that there is ‘an immediately 
discernible division–a bipartite division–between kinds of circumstances that 
bear on the legal correctness of criminal convictions’ (220). Thus, this insight is 
taken to be a bug in a model, which promises to be nothing less than scientific.90 
The superimposition of the theoretical tripartite analysis on the actual bipartite 
divide between P- and D-facts–‘which the model superficially ignores’ (229)–
seemingly creates an unsustainable asymmetry between theory and procedural 
practice, an–in Kuhnian terms–‘anomaly’91 which under normal circumstances 
should force the theorists who operate with the German legal order to give up on 
the model. 
However, Duarte d’Almeida’s analysis is wrong for the following reasons. 
The tripartite character of the German–and not: Continental92–concept of ‘crime’ 
is a function of its design’s architecture. This is a matter of positive law. But this 
is by far not the end of the story, at least for all those who understand law as a 
unity–and Duarte d’Almeida is undoubtedly one of them. The bipartite divide is 
a rather different problem that is not attached to the structure of the German 
outline of crime. The distinction between P- and D-facts relates, as we have seen 
above (section 3.B), to the asymmetrical structure of their ascertainment. But 
this is an epistemic problem, not one of syntax. While fact-finders in German 
courts have to ‘positively’ ascertain the (subjective and objective) elements of 
some crime, they are not authorised or, indeed, allowed to examine all possible 
justifications or exculpation defences in order to proceed to the next procedural 
level and to finally convict the defendant–unless these exception/defeaters have 
become a ‘live issue’. This has been Hart’s insight all along. As soon as we 
positively establish the correspondence between an action and a respective 
‘Tatbestand’ (offence), by ascertaining all elements of the crime, the absence of 
proof of justification or exculpatory excuses is a proof of absence thereof. What 
is really important is that the syntax of ‘crime’ is not only compatible with a 
bipartite divide between P- and D-facts. Its ascertainment follows a rather 
default pattern. The ‘presumptive account’ Duarte d’Almeida notices (226), is 
exactly the appearance of such a defeasible structure for both steps 2 and 3 of 
the tripartite analysis. 
 
90 Dubber, ‘The Promise of German Criminal Law: A Science of Crime and Punishment’ (n 87) 1049–1072. 
91 TS Kuhn, ‘Anomaly and the Emergence of Scientific Discoveries’ in O Neurath (ed), The Structure of 
Scientific Revolutions (The University of Chicago Press, 3rd edn 1996), ch 6. 
92 For example, in the French Penal Code defences are laid down in Art. 122-1 to 122-8 thereof (Art. 122-1 C. 
pén). The legal consequence of all legal defences is simply unpunishability (‘n’est pas responsible’). 
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In a nutshell: German doctrine distinguishes several categories and stages 
of grounds of nonconvictability such as justifications (necessity, consent, etc.) 
and excuses (intoxication, insanity, etc.), whereas there is no legal or doctrinal 
distinction between those categories in a jurisdiction such as those in the UK.93 
This enables the German model to treat similar cases alike and different cases 
differently, thus increasing the level of justice in the administration of the law.94 
Of course, the tripartite analysis of ‘crime’ does not stop us from applying a 
defeasible structure for the ascertainment of legal wrongfulness and culpability, 
but, on the contrary, allows us to do that in more differentiated–or, allow me to 
say: elegant–ways, thus triggering a range of doctrine-based legal consequences. 
The German model has the complexity to differentiate in terms of legal 
consequences between justificatory and excusatory defences, believing–as a 
(very) German philosopher would say–that ‘seeing things as similar and making 
things the same is the sign of weak eyes’.95 This feature is a function of the 
model’s ability to process more combinatorial possibilities.96 While defences 
lead to an acquittal in general, the distinction between ‘Unrecht’ and ‘Schuld’, 
indeed the mere existence of a wrongful act, is relevant for the judicial decision-
making process for a number of legal reasons. Here are only a few examples: 
– Self-defence is permitted only against unlawful actions (§ 32 GPC). 
– The distinction between Unrecht and Schuld allows us to attach the 
punishability of the accessor to the wrongfulness of the perpetrator’s act 
(§§ 26, 27 GPC, accessory liability). 
– A person who committed a wrongful criminal act without having 
acted culpably can be subjected to a measure of rehabilitation and security 
(§ 63 GPC).97 
In other words, the very concept of legal wrongfulness facilitates more 
combinatorial possibilities by establishing more and more accurate connections 
between different elements of the model. Of course, as Weigend remarks, 
‘German law does not have a concept of “defences” in the sense that a defendant 
would have to come forward with certain grounds that exclude punishability’.98 
But this is a general feature of models: allowing for certain combinations of 
 
93 See only A Ashwort, ‘United Kingdom’ in KJ Heller and MD Dubber (eds), The Handbook of Comparative 
Criminal Law (Stanford Law Books, 2011) 541. 
94 Hart, ‘Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals’ (n 42) 624: ‘It is, however, true that one essential 
element of the concept of justice is the principle of treating like cases alike. This is justice in the administration 
of the law, not justice of the law.’ 
95 F Nietzsche, The Gay Science trans. W Kaufmann (Vintage Books, 1974) para 128; after all, it is Duarte 
d’Almeida himself, who among others laments that the term ‘defences’ encompasses diverse circumstances (32, 
with more discussion in the footnotes). 
96 On saying this, I do not close my eyes to the endemic problems of the ‘German’ model. 
97 With the ‘Law against dangerous recidivists and regarding measures of protection and rehabilitation’, Nov. 24, 
1933, measures of security and rehabilitation were added to criminal penalties provided from the German Penal 
Code. 
98 T Weigend, ‘Germany’ in KJ Heller and MD Dubber (eds), The Handbook of Comparative Criminal Law 
(Stanford Law Books, 2011) 268. 
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elements and at the same time excluding others. If put forward in an effective 
way, justifications and excuses will get us ‘out of it’ (192)–just like defences do. 
Yet they will do it in very different and (regarding the legal consequences) 
distinctive ways. Duarte d’Almeida’s blitzkrieg against the tripartite analysis of 
‘crime’–he devotes 10 pages to such a thorny matter–takes its toll: creating 
confusion about both the content of German criminal law and its theoretical 
blueprint. 
 
4. Final Remarks 
In this review article, I have first tried to facilitate a proper understanding of 
Hart’s legal theoretical oeuvre by pointing out its roots in the Oxford Ordinary 
Language Philosophy. My goal was to read Duarte d’Almeida’s monograph 
against this philosophical background which yields, I suggested, a better 
understanding of the syntax of legal exceptions (defeaters). The pressure points I 
have put forward should not blur the picture. I have written this article in 
admiration for the project of clarifying the theoretical status of legal exceptions. 
In a nutshell, one could say that this is one of those irritating review articles ‘that 
heaps up its praises with an undertaker’s shovel’.99 I mention that in all sincerity, 
because Duarte d’Almeida scrutinises the paradigm rather than confining 
himself in an uncritical puzzle-solving within an unsustainable distinction 
between substantive and procedural rules.100 
 The result is a challenging book that merits our attention. The most 
notable feature of Duarte d’Almeida’s approach is his aspiration to root judicial 
practice in fundamental principles of legal theory. Problematic are the principles 
he chooses to operate with. From a set of axioms and rules as well as by using 
the resources of a predicate calculus, Duarte d’Almeida’s model is supposed to 
yield for every defeasible decision φ a statement of the form “φ is correct if and 
only if ψ”. I endeavoured to show how the predicate calculus is not a viable 
choice in order to excavate the form of a judicial decision through logical 
analysis, which is allegedly ‘disguised by natural language’.101 We must not 
forget that this has been the dominant approach in the philosophy of science 
during the first half of the 20th century (syntactic view of theories).102 Leaving 
aside the fact that according to this approach, the respective theory is expected 
to be axiomatised within a formal language (which could provide the suitable 
tools for achieving the desired precision), the main problem has been that it is 
 
99 P Roberts, ‘Loss of Innocence in Common Law Presumptions’ (2014) 8(2) Criminal Law and Philosophy 317. 
100 See Kuhn (n 91) 42; Popper treats ‘normal scientists’ as ‘a person one ought to be sorry for’. For he ‘has been 
taught badly […] He has been taught in a dogmatic spirit […] He has learned a technique which can be applied 
without asking for the reason why’ (K Popper, ‘Normal Science and its Dangers’ in I Lakatos and A Musgrave 
(eds), Criticism and The Growth of Knowledge (Cambridge University Press 1970) 52-3). 
101 Schroeder, Wittgenstein (n 13) 228. 
102 W Stegmüller, The Structuralist View of Theories: A Possible Analogue of the Bourbaki Programme in 
Physical Science (Springer, 1979) 4-5. 
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‘not humanly possible’ to carry out the programme suggested by the syntactic 
view of theories. Stegmüller warns us that even for an extraordinary logician, the 
difference between formal logic (ie axiomatisation in a formal language) and 
informally set theory ‘is the difference between a few years of work and a few 
weeks (or perhaps afternoons) of work’.103 
 Fortunately, defeasibility is radically simpler than that.104 The language 
game we play in order to master it is already being taught at a very early age. 
For example every time a mother tells her child, ‘You will stay in your room 
unless the sun comes out’, the child understands that a) her default status is to 
remain in her room and to play or do her homework, and b) the only thing 
(defeater) that could change that is ‘sunshine’. Admittedly, a legal process is 
much more complicated than that. But this is not a matter of syntax. 
Duarte d’Almeida sets unusually high standards. He wants to ‘succeed 
where Hart has failed’.105 I think that his aspiration is wrong from the very 
beginning. But this does not change much, since science and philosophy are 
nothing but a chronicle of failures.106 And Duarte d’Almeida’s (part-way) failure 
is our success, since his model helps the theoretical legal community regain its 
character as a catalyst of legal practice. What is perhaps most distinctive about 
his book is that the model cuts across the substantive or the procedural readings 
of legal orders and treats law as a unity. This has been Hart’s agenda all along, 
too: to abandon formalism and to pursue a model-based doctrinal study of law 
instead. The economist or the scientist, Hart remarks, ‘often uses a simple 
model with which to understand the complex; and this can be done for the 
law’.107 I can only add: this has been done here, too. Duarte d’Almeida’s model 
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103 Ibid, 6. 
104 One should not confuse the simplicity of the argument with its superficiality. 
105 L. Duarte d’Almeida, ‘A Proof-Based Account of Legal Exceptions’ (2013) 33(1) Oxford Journal of Legal 
Studies 133. 
106 M Williams, Unnatural Doubts: Epistemological Realism and the Basis of Scepticism (Oxford University 
Press, 1991) 17. 
107 Hart, ‘Definition and Theory in Jurisprudence’ (n 7) 42. 
